"Distinguish one-way and two-way door decisions -- speed for reversible ones, deliberation for irreversible ones"
Evidence from the Archive
Amazon (Working Backwards LLC)
Amazon's bar-raiser program ensures consistent hiring standards across all single-threaded teams
Amazon Kindle had a single-threaded leader from day one -- one person obsessed with one thing, turning a bookstore into a hardware company
Spent 15 years at Amazon starting five years after founding, launched and managed Amazon Music, Prime Video, and Amazon Studios as VP of Digital Media Their core argument: Amazon's single-threaded leader model is the evolved form of the GM -- one person owns one thing with dedicated resources, but with deliberate countermeasures for functional excellence.
The evidence is specific: Amazon Kindle had a single-threaded leader from day one -- one person obsessed with one thing, turning a bookstore into a hardware company. Furthermore, prime Video broke teams down by platform surface: TV sets, game consoles, mobile -- each with clear ownership and no resource contention. Amazon's bar-raiser program ensures consistent hiring standards across all single-threaded teams.
In Bill Carr's own words: "Any org structure, you're trading off one thing for another thing. In this case, you're trading off potentially functional excellence." (On the inherent tradeoff in moving to single-threaded leaders.)
Amazon
Jeff Bezos and the S-Team reviewed input metrics weekly, not quarterly output metrics
Amazon tracked selection breadth, delivery speed, page load times, and price competitiveness as input metrics -- all controllable by teams
Spent 15 years at Amazon starting from its fifth year. Launched Amazon Music, Prime Video, and Amazon Studios as VP of Digital Media. Co-authored Working Backwards, the definitive book on Amazon's operating methods. Their core argument: Focus on input metrics (controllable drivers of customer experience), not output metrics (lagging results) -- this is how Amazon won.
The evidence is specific: Amazon tracked selection breadth, delivery speed, page load times, and price competitiveness as input metrics -- all controllable by teams. Furthermore, jeff Bezos and the S-Team reviewed input metrics weekly, not quarterly output metrics. Amazon's Fire Phone failure shows that even with input metrics, the wrong problem (3D effects nobody needed) leads to the wrong inputs.
In Bill Carr's own words: "We then figured out ways to measure them creating a set of input metrics. And so then when we would develop our operating plans and review our business each week and set our goals, we were hyperfocused on those inputs and the input metrics." (How Amazon operationalized input metrics through weekly reviews.)
Amazon (Working Backwards LLC)
Amazon's transition from project-based to program-based orientation with single-threaded leaders
The PRFAQ process at Amazon where many great ideas were intentionally not shipped in favor of better ones
Carr spent 15 years at Amazon where he launched Amazon Music, Prime Video, and Amazon Studios, then co-authored Working Backwards--the definitive guide to Amazon's operating principles, now implemented at hundreds of growth-stage companies. Their core argument: Distinguish one-way and two-way door decisions -- speed for reversible ones, deliberation for irreversible ones.
The evidence is specific: Amazon's transition from project-based to program-based orientation with single-threaded leaders. Furthermore, the PRFAQ process at Amazon where many great ideas were intentionally not shipped in favor of better ones. Amazon's launch of digital music, Prime Video, and Amazon Studios using working backwards methodology.
In Bill Carr's own words: "To really go fast, you actually need to go slow first and to be very clear on what you're doing and where you want to go. Most people confuse speed with velocity, and the difference between the two is that velocity has both speed and a vector to it." (Amazon's philosophy on speed vs velocity.)